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Abstract
In this paper we study the effect that the external management of a
limited (natural) resource such as carbon dioxide or water quotas has on
the behaviour of firms in a given sector. To do this, we choose a model in
which all firms have the same technology and this is lineal. In the analysis
of the problem games in partition function form arise in a natural way. It
is proved, under certain conditions, that stable allocations exist in both
cases with certainty and uncertainty.
AMS classification: 90B30, 91A12.
JEL Classification: C71.
Keywords: cooperative TU-games in partition function form, linear
production situations, common-pool resource.
1 Introduction
In this paper we introduce linear production situations in which there is a limited
common-pool resource. It is managed by an external agent and is absolutely
necessary to produce any product. This type of situation appears frequently
in real-life situations related to natural resource management such as when the
producers need to buy carbon dioxide, water or fish quotas or even to obtain
public capital to invest in their firms. Imagine the case that the producers, due
to a new environmental regulation, have to introduce a restriction concerning the
emissions of greenhouse gases, for instance. Let us assume that the greenhouse
gases quotas can be bought from an external agent, who has a limited amount, at
a given market price. We wonder what the effect of this common-pool resource
on cooperation among firms will be when they have linear production techniques.
∗Corresponding author, e-mail: joaquin@umh.es
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Linear production (LP ) situations are situations where several producers
own resource bundles. They can use these resources to produce various prod-
ucts via linear production techniques that are available to all producers. The
goal of each producer is to maximize their profit, which equals the revenue of
their products at the given market prices. These situations and correspond-
ing cooperative games are introduced in Owen (1975), where it is shown that
these games always have a non empty core by constructing a core-element via
a related dual linear program. Gellekom et al. (2000) named the set of all the
core-elements that can be found in this way, the ‘Owen set’, and they provide
a characterization of this. More general are situations involving a countably
infinite number of products that can be produced. Tijs et al. (2001) study
relations between the Owen set and the core of these semi-infinite situations.
When a limited common-pool resource is introduced in an LP situation
this leads to a linear production situation with a common-pool resource (LPP
situation). Although it may intuitively seem that when introducing a small
change in the LP model everything will work in a similar way, in this case
it is not true because, for instance, the games that arise in these situations
are partition function form games and the existence of stable allocations is not
always guaranteed.
Models with a limited external common resource have generally been ad-
dressed, in the literature, from the non-cooperative perspective. However, as
Hardin (1968) points out the so-called tragedy of commons, where the common
pool resource is overused, can occur. This is the main reason why we have con-
sidered a cooperative perspective in our model. Driessen and Meinhardt (2001)
use a classic cooperative game, defined from a non-cooperative one, in which
the value of a coalition (group of producers) is obtained from a two-person game
where the members of the coalition try to maximize their profits in the worst
case. Funaki and Yamato (1999) provide a cooperative approach to a model of
an economy with a common-pool resource, where the demands on it are addi-
tive. In our case, we are interested in addressing LP situations with a limited
common-pool resource from a cooperative point of view, where the value of a
coalition is determined by taking into account not only what the members of
the coalition can do, but also what outsiders can do. Thus, our model implies
the use of games in partition function form introduced by Thrall and Lucas
(1963) as in Funaki and Yamato (1999). In their model the distribution of fish
(common-pool resource) among fishermen is carried out in proportion to the
amount of labor involved.
This paper tackles the problem of allocating the common-pool resource fo-
cused on LPP situations. As in Funaki and Yamato (1999), the core of the
games in partition function form associated with these situations can be reduced
to the core of a related game in characteristic function form. The amount of
the common-pool resource available can play a crucial role in the analysis of
the associated games. We distinguish two cases: when the cooperation of all
producers enables the common-pool resource to be sufficient for them and when
it is not sufficient. In the former case, we show that the core of the games in
partition function form is non empty. In the latter situation, additional condi-
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tions are needed to assure the non emptiness of the core. The analysis of both
cases is carried out taking into account that the partition function is unknown
because the producers do not know how the common-pool resource is to be
assigned. Therefore, this problem is approached as one with uncertainty. The
study, where the partition function is known exactly, is left for further reseach.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains basic concepts on co-
operative transferable utility games. In Section 3 linear production situations
with a common-pool resource are introduced. We show that if the common-pool
resource is not a constraint for the production process, or if it is so only for the
coalition of all producers, these games can be reduced to games in characteris-
tic function form. In the first case, we can find allocations in the core of the
corresponding games, but in the second one the core can be empty. We intro-
duce a new concept for partitions to be partitionally stable, which allows us,
in some sense, to extend the concept of the core. In Section 4 we assume that
the producers do not know how the common-pool resource will be distributed.
Therefore, we introduce common-pool resource games to deal with this uncer-
tainty. Different points of view can be used to define these games, we study the
two extremes: the optimistic and pessimistic. Section 5 concludes.
2 Preliminaries
Let N be a non empty finite set of agents who agree to coordinate their actions.
A cooperative game in characteristic function form is an ordered pair (N, v) ,
where N is the set of players and v : 2N → R is the characteristic function with
v(∅) = 0. This function assigns to each group of players (coalition), S ⊂ N, the
value v(S) which represents what the members in S obtain when they cooperate
jointly. In a transferable utility game (TU -game) it is assumed that the utility
can be linearly transferred among agents.
A classic issue in cooperative game theory is how to distribute the profit
generated by the cooperating players. One way to do this is to use allocations
in the core of the game. The core, C (v) , of a characteristic function form game
(N, v) , introduced by Gillies (1953), is the subset of vectors in RN satisfying
(Efficiency)
∑
i∈N xi = v(N), and
(Coalitional rationality)
∑
i∈S xi ≥ v(S), for all S ⊂ N .
Bankruptcy problems were first introduced by O’Neill (1982). A standard
bankruptcy problem can be described by a triple (N,E, d), where N = {1, ..., n}
is the finite set of agents, E ≥ 0 is the estate to be divided and d ∈ RN+ , the
vector of claims, is such that
∑
i∈N di ≥ E. To deal with a bankruptcy problem
(N,E, d) we can derive a classical bankruptcy TU -game (N, v), where the value
of a coalition S ⊂ N is given by
v(S) = max{E −
∑
i∈N\S
di, 0},
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and represents what is left for the players in S after the demands of the players
in N\S have been satisfied. These games have a non empty core.
In order to deal with our model, we will need to consider games in partition
function form introduced by Thrall and Lucas (1963), where the worth of a
coalition S depends not only on what the members in S can do, but also on
what outsiders do. These are cooperative games with externalities. Formally,
let P(N) denote the set of all partitions of N and P = {S1, . . . , Sk} represents
one of these partitions or coalition structures, where the coalitions S1, . . . , Sk
are disjoint and their union is N . The pair (S|P ) such that S ∈ P is usually
called an embedded coalition. A cooperative game in partition function form is
defined by
(
N,P(N), {V (•|P )}P∈P(N)
)
, where N is the set of players, P(N)
denotes the set of all partitions of N and V (S|P ) with S ∈ P is a real number
that represents the profit that a coalition S ⊆ N can obtain when P is formed.
Note that the profit that a coalition can obtain depends on the coalitions formed
by the other players in P ∈ P(N).
Given a partition P ∈ P(N), a vector x ∈ Rn is said to be feasible under P
if it satisfies
∑
i∈S
xi ≤ V (S|P ) , ∀S ∈ P. We denote by FP the set of all feasible
vectors under P and F = ∪P∈P(N)F
P denotes the set of all feasible vectors.
Given two vectors x, x′ in Rn, as in Funaki and Yamato (1999) we say that x
dominates x′ through S and denote x domS x
′ if the following conditions are
satified:
1.
∑
i∈S
xi ≤ V (S|P ) , ∀P ∈ P(N) such that S ∈ P,
2. xi > x
′
i, ∀i ∈ S.
We say that x dominates x′ if there exists S ⊆ N such that x domS x′, and
denote x dom x′. The core of a cooperative game in partition function form
is defined by C (V ) = {x ∈ F |∄x′ ∈ F s.t. x′ dom x} . However, if we consider
another definition of dominance, then we will obtain a different core. Thus, if
we change condition 1 by
1.
∑
i∈S
xi ≤ V (S|P ) , for some P ∈ P(N) with S ∈ P,
we obtain a more restrictive concept of dominance that we denote by dom and
the corresponding core is defined as C (V ) =
{
x ∈ F
∣∣∄x′ ∈ F s.t. x′ dom x} .
Associated with each game in partition function form two cooperative games
in characteristic function form can be introduced: (N, v−) and (N, v+), where
v− (S) = min {V (S|P ) |P ∈ P(N) such that S ∈ P } ,
v+ (S) = max {V (S|P ) |P ∈ P(N) such that S ∈ P } .
(N, v−) represents a pessimistic point of view of the gain that a coalition S
can get, while (N, v+) can be seen as optimistic. Funaki and Yamato (1999)
proved that if V ({N}|N) >
∑
S∈P
V (S|P ) , ∀P ∈ P(N), then
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a) C(V ) = C(v−), and
b) C (V ) = C(v+).
Given P, P ′ ∈ P(N), P ′ is a refinement of P if for all S′ ∈ P ′ there exits
S ∈ P such that S′ ⊆ S, and it is denoted by P ′ ⊆ P . Using the concept of
refinement an ordering of partitions arise in a natural way, with this ordering
(P(N),⊆) is the so-called partition lattice.
3 Linear production situations with a common-
pool resource
Let N = {1, . . . , n} be a set of producers that face a linear production problem
to produce a set G = {1, . . . , g} of goods from a set Q = {1, . . . , q} of resources.
There exists an external common-pool resource, limited by an amount of r, that
agents need to buy for producing the goods. The parameters of the model are:
• bi ∈ Rq+ are the available resources for each producer i ∈ N , b
S =
∑
i∈S b
i.
B ∈ Mq×n is the resource matrix. We assume that there is a positive
quantity available of each resource, that is, for all resources t ∈ Q there is
a producer i such that bti > 0.
• The common pool-resource is not endowed to the producers but managed
by an external agent. Its cost per unit is c and the total available is
denoted by r.
• A ∈M(q+1)×g is the production matrix, atj represents the amount of the
resource t needed to produce the product j, where the last row is related
to the common-pool resource and a(q+1)j > 0 ∀ j ∈ G. Furthermore, we
do not allow for output without input and therefore there exists at least
one resource t ∈ Q with atj > 0 ∀ j ∈ G.
• p ∈ Rg++ is the price vector. Moreover, in order to deal with a profitable
process we assume that pj > a(q+1)jc ∀ j ∈ G.
Therefore, a linear production situation with a common-pool resource (LPP )
can be represented by (A,B, p, r, c) .
To maximize his profit, producer i needs an optimal production plan (x; z) ∈
Rg+1+ that tells him how much he should produce of each good, x, and how much
he needs of the common-pool resource, z. Not all production plans are feasible
since the producer has to take into account his limited amount of resources.
The amount of resources needed in a feasible production plan should not exceed
the amount of resources avaliables for producer i. Furthermore, a feasible pro-
duction plan has to be nonnegative since we are only interested in producing
nonnegative quantities of the products. The following linear program maximizes
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the profit of producer i
max
∑g
j=1 pjxj − cz
s.t: Ax ≤
(
bi
z
)
x ≥ 0g, z ≥ 0.
Thus, an optimal production plan for producer i is an optimal solution of this
linear program. Apart from producing on their own, producers are allowed
to cooperate. If a coalition S of producers cooperates then they put all their
resources together and so given this amount of resources, the coalition wishes
to maximize its profit,
max
∑g
j=1 pjxj − cz
s.t: Ax ≤
(
bS
z
)
x ≥ 0g, z ≥ 0.
(1)
With an abuse of notation, we use z to represent the amount of the common-
pool resource that a producer or a group of producers will need. We denote by
value (S; z) the value of this linear program, for every fixed z.
The optimal demand of the common-pool resource for each coalition S,
dS = min {z ∈ R+ |value (S; z) is maximum} , is obtained by solving the lin-
ear program (1). We should point out that these optimal demands are the
desired amount of the common-pool resource for each coalition S and can be
seen as their utopic or greatest aspirations a priori, before the common-pool
resource is allocated. Note that they are not bounded from above by r.
Although it may seem that these demands are superadditive, i. e. dS ≥∑
i∈S d{i}, this is not true as the next example shows.
Example 1 Let (A,B, r, p, c) be an LPP situation, with two producers, N =
{1, 2} , who produce three products from two resources and a common-pool re-
source, where
A =

 1 0 10 1 1
2 2 1

 , B = [ 4 1
1 4
]
, p =

 44
8

 , c = 1, r = 5.
In this case, d{1} = d{2} = 7 while d{12} = 5.
Next we present a technical result which guarantees that once we know that
a positive profit is achieved, all the lower levels of the common-pool resource
also provide positive profits.
Proposition 2 Let S ⊆ N , if there is z∗ such that value (S; z∗) > 0, then
value (S; z) > 0, for all z with 0 < z < z∗.
Proof. Let z such that 0 < z < z∗ and x∗ the optimal solution corresponding to
value (S; z∗) . Consider xz = zz∗ x
∗. The point (xz ; z) is feasible for the problem
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corresponding to S. Furthermore, it holds that:
∑g
j=1 pjx
∗
j − cz
∗ > 0 =⇒ zz∗
(∑g
j=1 pjx
∗
j − cz
∗
)
> 0 =⇒∑g
j=1 pj
(
z
z∗ x
∗
j
)
− c
(
z
z∗ z
∗
)
> 0 =⇒
∑g
j=1 pjx
z
j − cz > 0.
. 
In the sequel, we will assume that for all S, there is a feasible production
plan (x; z) such that value (S; z) > 0. This implies that dS > 0.
Let us assume that P is formed and, either through a collaborative procedure
or through a competitive mechanism1, the amount of the common-pool resource
finally allocated to coalition S ∈ P by the manager is zS(P ). The profit that a
coalition S ⊆ N can obtain is given by
max
∑g
j=1 pjxj − czS(P )
s.t: Ax ≤
(
bS
zS(P )
)
x ≥ 0g.
(2)
We should point out that zS(P ) is bounded from above by r, because the
manager of the common-pool resource cannot exceed this amount, while this
does not hold for dS , for all S ⊆ N.
Depending on the procedure used to obtain zS(P ), which will be less or
equal to its optimal demand dS , we can define different games. These games
are not characteristic function form games, but partition function form games
and the amount available of the common-pool resource can play a crucial role
on analysis.
Definition 3 Let (A,B, p, r, c) be an LPP situation. The partition function
form game associated with this situation is given by
(
N,P(N), {V (•|P )}P∈P(N)
)
,
where N is the set of players, P(N) denotes the set of all partitions of N and
V (S|P ) with S ∈ P is obtained from the linear program (2), for all S ⊂ N,
where zS(P ) is the amount of common-pool resource avaliable for coalition S
when partition P is formed.
Proposition 4 Let (A,B, p, r, c) be an LPP situation and
(
N,P(N), {V (•|P )}P∈P(N)
)
the corresponding partition function form game. Then,
V (N | {N}) ≥
∑
S∈P
V (S|P ) , ∀P ∈ P(N).
Proof. Given P ∈ P(N), V (S|P ) = value (S; zS(P )) , ∀S ∈ P such that∑
S∈P
zS(P ) ≤ r. Let be
(
xS ; zS(P )
)
an optimal plan for each coalition S ∈ P .
1At this moment we do not specify any process, what follows holds in any case.
7
Thus, AxS ≤
(
bS
zS(P )
)
and
A
( ∑
S∈P
xS
)
≤


∑
S∈P
bS∑
S∈P
zS(P )

 ≤ ( bN
r
)
.
Then,
( ∑
S∈P
xS ;
∑
S∈P
zS(P )
)
is a feasible production plan for N and
∑
S∈P
value (S; zS(P )) ≤ value
(
N ;
∑
S∈P
zS(P )
)
≤ V (N | {N}) .

It is easy to check that C (V ) and C (V ) only include efficient allocations.
The following consequences are give without a proof because they can be derived
in a similar manner as in Funaki and Yamato (1999).
Corollary 5 Let (A,B, p, r, c) be an LPP situation,
(
N,P(N), {V (•|P )}P∈P(N)
)
the corresponding partition function form game and (N, v−) , (N, v+) the related
games in characteristic function form. Then, C (V ) = C (v−) and C (V ) =
C (v+) .
If
(
N,P(N), {V (•|P )}P∈P(N)
)
is such that, ∀S ⊆ N, ∀P ∈ P(N) with
S ∈ P , V (S|P ) = v (S), then the two definitions of dominance are equivalent,
(N, v) is a game in characteristic function form and the core reduces to the
well-known definition for games in characteristic function form. Next we show
other two situations in which this holds.
Given a partition P = {S1, . . . , Sk}, its total demand is d(P ) =
∑k
i=1 dSi .
An outstanding set associated with both the common-pool resource and the set
of all partitions is the following:
Mmin = {P ∈ P(N) : d(P ) > r and P is minimal for the operator ⊆},
where P is minimal for the operator ⊆ means that there is no refinement P ′ of
P with d(P ′) > r.
The next results show that if the common-pool resource is not a constraint
on the production process, i.e. Mmin = ∅, or it is only a restriction for the
grand coalition, i.e. Mmin = {N} , then the corresponding partition function
form games are characteristic function form games.
Proposition 6 Let (A,B, p, r, c) be an LPP situation. If Mmin = ∅, then the
corresponding game
(
N,P(N), {V (•|P )}P∈P(N)
)
is a characteristic function
form game.
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Proof. If Mmin = ∅, then we have dN ≤ r. Thus, zS(P ) = dS for all S ⊆ N,
due to d (P ) ≤ r for all P . Therefore, for each S ⊆ N, V (S|P ) = V (S|P ′)
for all P, P
′
∈ P(N) such that S ∈ P , i.e. for each coalition the value does not
depend on the coalitions formed by other players. 
Proposition 7 Let (A,B, p, r, c) be an LPP situation. If {N} ∈ Mmin, then
Mmin = {N} and the related game
(
N,P(N), {V (•|P )}P∈P(N)
)
is a charac-
teristic function form game.
Proof. If {N} ∈Mmin then, since {N} is minimal for the operator ⊆, dN > r
and d (P ) ≤ r for all P ∈ P(N), P 6= {N} . Similarly to Proposition 6, for each
S ⊆ N, V (S|P ) = V (S|P ′) for all P, P
′
∈ P(N), i.e. the value of coalition S
does not depend on the coalitions formed by other players. On the other hand,
the value of the grand coalition
max
∑g
j=1 pjxj − cr
s.t: Ax ≤
(
bN
r
)
x ≥ 0g.
(3)
only depends on its own, since there is no partition including N as a proper
subset. Therefore, the related game is a characteristic function form game. 
Let (A,B, p, r, c) be an LPP situation. The characteristic function form
game associated with one of the two previous situations (N, v), where dN ≤ r
or dN > r and d (P ) ≤ r for all P 6= {N} , is given by v (S) = value (S; z), with
z = dS for all S 6= N and z = min {dN , r} for the grand coalition N. This is due
to the fact that the common-pool resource is sufficient to satify the demands
for all S 6= N, but for N the maximum amount avaliable is r.
The next result shows that the characteristic function form game obtained
when the common-pool resource is not a constraint for the production process
has a non empty core.
Theorem 8 Let (A,B, p, r, c) be an LPP situation with Mmin = ∅. The char-
acteristic function form game (N, v) associated with this situation has a non
empty core.
Proof. The dual problem of (1)2 for the grand coalition, N , is
min
∑q
t=1 b
N
t yt + 0yq+1
s.t: Aty ≥ p
yq+1 ≤ c
y ≥ 0q+1.
(4)
2We use this problem because it is known by hypotesis that ∃z ≤ r for all problems, i.e.
the common-pool resource is not scarce in any case.
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An optimal solution of (1) for the grand coalition N is given by
(
xN ; dN
)
with
dN ≤ r, and the related dual optimal solution is
(
yNq ; y
N
q+1
)
, where with an
abuse of notation from now on, we represent by yNq the vector
(
yN1 , ..., y
N
q
)
.
From duality, it is known that
∑g
j=1 pjx
N
j − cdN =
∑q
t=1 b
N
t y
N
t + 0y
N
q+1 =
v (N) . Therefore, somehow, the cost of the common-pool resource is charged to
(discounted from) the value of the resources. It is easy to check that
(
yNq ; y
N
q+1
)
is feasible in the dual problem of (1) for every coalition S ⊂ N. Moreover, we
have that for a dual optimal solution
(
ySq ; y
S
q+1
)
associated with the optimal
solution
(
xS ; dS
)
, it holds that
∑q
t=1 b
S
t y
N
t + 0y
N
q+1 ≥
∑q
t=1 b
S
t y
S
t + 0y
S
q+1 =
v (S) . Thus,
∑
i∈S
(∑q
t=1 b
i
ty
N
t + 0y
N
q+1
)
≥ v (S) , ∀S ⊂ N, and this implies that(
biyN
)
i∈N
∈ C (v) . 
Corollary 9 Let (A,B, p, r, c) be an LPP situation withMmin = ∅,
(
N,P(N), {V (•|P )}P∈P(N)
)
the corresponding partition function form game and (N, v) the related game in
characteristic function form. Then, C (V ) = C (V ) = C (v) .
Linear production (LP ) situations and corresponding cooperative games
were introduced in Owen (1975), where it is shown that these games have a
nonempty core by constructing a core-element via a related dual linear pro-
gram. Gellekom et al. (2000) named the set of all the core-elements that can
be found in the same way as performed by Owen, the ‘Owen set’. Following
this idea, we can introduce the Owen set of an LPP situation (A,B, p, r, c) ,
Owen (A,B, p, r, c) , as the set whose elements can be obtained through an op-
timal solution of (4) associated with the optimal solution of (1)
(
xN ; dN
)
such
that dN ≤ r. To sum up, when M
min = ∅ one way to obtain a stable distribu-
tion of the total profit is to use an element of the so-called Owen set of the LPP
situation (A,B, p, r, c) . We should mention that this is similar to the classical
results in the LP situations. However, it does not always work in the same way.
Although the games such as those in Proposition 7 are characteristic function
form games, they can have an empty core, as the following example shows.
Example 10 Let (A,B, r, p, c) be an LPP situation, with three producers, N =
{1, 2, 3} , who produce three products from three resources and a common-pool
resource, where
A =


3 6 6
6 6 6
5 10 6
2 4 4

 , B =

 15 6 94 18 9
16 19 2

 , p =

 109
9

 , c = 2, r = 10.
The demands are
d{1} =
4
3 , d{2} = 4, d{3} =
4
5 ,
d{12} =
22
3 , d{13} =
17
3 , d{23} =
42
5 , dN =
31
3 ,
10
and min
{
31
3 , 10
}
= 10. Since Mmin = {N} the corresponding TU-game (N, v)
associated with this situation is given by
v ({1}) = 4, v ({2}) = 12, v ({3}) = 125 ,
v ({12}) = 22, v ({13}) = 13, v ({23}) = 1265 , v (N) = 30,
and C (v) = ∅. Obviously, C (V ) = C (V ) = ∅
Looking at this example one can observe that the partitions {N\ {i} , {i}}i∈N
are the only stable in the following sense.
Definition 11 A partition P ∈ P(N) is said to be partitionally stable if the
following two conditions hold ∀S ∈ P
(1) C
(
vS
)
6= ∅, and
(2) ∄ {Tk}
l
k=1 ∈ P such that C

vS∪
{
l⋃
k=1
Tk
}
 6= ∅,
where
(
S, vS
)
is the game reduced to coalition S when partition P is formed.
This definition of stability holds for games in partition function form (with
whatever concept of dominance) and in characteristic function form and allows
us, in some sense, to extend the concept of the core. Note that when the core of a
game is non empty, then the grand coalition is the only one which is partitionally
stable.
Proposition 12 Let (A,B, p, r, c) be an LPP situation with {N} ∈ Mmin.
The partitions {N\ {i} , {i}}i∈N are the only partitionally stable or the grand
coalition if the core of the game is non empty.
Proof. If the core of the game is non empty the result holds. If it is empty,
dN\{i}+d{i} ≤ r, dN > r. The games associated with {N\ {i}}i∈N and {{i}}i∈N
have a non empty core by Proposition 8 and any other partition does not satisfy
condition (2) in the previous definition. 
In the more general case, when the common-pool resource could be a con-
straint for the production process for some partition, each coalition of producers
will obtain an amount of common-pool resource from either through a collab-
orative procedure or through a competitive mechanism. With respect to the
information that they have on this process, we consider that they do not know
the way in which r will be shared. The next section tackles this situation.
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4 The common-pool resource game
In this section we assume that producers do not know how the common-pool
resource is to be assigned. Therefore, they do not know the partition func-
tion form game V, so they face a problem under uncertainty. Thus, they can
examine the problem of the amount they will receive from different points of
view. We consider that what a coalition of producers S expects to receive from
the common-pool resource can be described by the common-pool resource game
(N,R) . These games are cooperative TU−games in characteristic function form
and can be defined following different approaches. There are two extreme cases,
depending on which point of view is used to deal with the situation, the opti-
mistic and the pessimistic common-pool resource games, that will be addressed
in this section. Hence, R (S) is what coalition S thinks it can guarantee from
the common-pool resource working on their own. It can be any value between
those obtained from the optimistic and pessimistic points of view.
Once a coalition of producers S received its share of the common-pool re-
source, R (S) , using this amount as zS(P ) in (2), for all S ⊆ N, the LPP game(
N, vR
)
is obtained, where vR (S) = value (S;R (S)) . In this way, the game as-
sociated with the LPP situation (A,B, r, p, c) obtained from the common-pool
resource game (N,R) reduces to a characteristic function form game,
(
N, vR
)
,
since it does not depend on what the others may do.
The following theorem states a sufficient condition for the LPP game
(
N, vR
)
to have a non empty core when dN > r, no matter from what point of view the
common-pool resource game (N,R) is defined. The case dN ≤ r is studied in
subsection 4.1.
Theorem 13 Let (A,B, p, r, c) be an LPP situation, let (N,R) be the common-
pool resource game associated with it, and
(
N, vR
)
the corresponding LPP game.
When dN > r if C (R) 6= ∅, then C
(
vR
)
6= ∅.
Proof. Since C (R) 6= ∅, there is u ∈ RN such that u(S) =
∑
i∈S ui ≥ R (S) ,
for all S, and u(N) = r. Let y∗ be an optimal solution of the dual problem of
(3). From duality theory, we know that
∑q
t=1 b
N
t y
∗
t + ry
∗
q+1 − cr = v
R(N). On
the other hand, ∀S ⊆ N
q∑
t=1
bSt y
∗
t + u (S) y
∗
q+1 − cu (S) ≥
q∑
t=1
bSt y
∗
t +R (S) (y
∗
q+1 − c) ≥ v
R(S),
where the last inequality holds because y∗ is feasible for the dual problem of
coalition S and y∗q+1 > c since dN > r. Thus,
(
biy∗ + ui
(
y∗q+1 − c
))
i∈N
∈
C
(
vR
)
6= ∅. 
However, the opposite is not true in general as the next example shows.
12
Example 14 Let (A,B, r, p, c) be an LPP situation, with two producers, N =
{1, 2} , who produce three products from two resources and a common-pool re-
source, where
A =

 1 0 10 1 1
2 2 1

 , B = [ 4 1
1 4
]
, p =

 44
8

 , c = 1, r = 4.
Consider the common-pool resource game, (N,R), such that R ({1}) = R ({2}) =
R ({12}) = 4. In this case, C (R) = ∅, dN = 5 and vR ({1}) = vR ({2}) =
10, vR (N) = 28, thus C
(
vR
)
6= ∅.
4.1 The optimistic approach
From an optimistic point of view, a coalition of producers S will obtain its de-
mand. The related common-pool resource game (N,Ropt) is such thatRopt (S) =
min {dS , r} .
Using the amount Ropt (S) in (2), for all S ⊆ N, the optimistic LPP game
(N, vopt) is derived.
The core of this class of games can be non empty, as Example 14 illustrates.
But C (vopt) = ∅ on many occasions, as the next example shows.
Example 15 Let (A,B, r, p, c) be an LPP situation, with three producers, N =
{1, 2, 3} , who produce two products from two resources and a common-pool re-
source, where
A =

 2 33 2
1 1

 , B = [ 40 60 80
60 40 50
]
, p =
(
50
60
)
, c = 14, r = 50
and (N, vopt) the related optimistic LPP game. In this case, the core of the
optimistic LPP game will be all the points in R3 such that
x1 ≥ 720, x2 ≥ 920, x3 ≥ 1150,
x1 + x2 ≥ 1640, x1 + x3 ≥ 1936, x2 + x3 ≥ 2070, x1 + x2 + x3 = 2300,
but it can be seen that there is no point satisfying all the above inequalities,
then C (vopt) = ∅. Taking into account that
d{1} = 20, d{2} = 20, d{3} = 25,
d{12} = 40, d{13} = 46, d{23} = 45, dN = 66 and min {66, 50} = 50,
it is easy to check that C (Ropt) = ∅.
We will study a situation in which C (vopt) is non empty, but first we need
some results. The following lemma tells us that when the common-pool resource
is sufficient for the grand coalition, then the value of the grand coalition is an
upper bound for the sum of the optimistic values in every partition.
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Lemma 16 Let (A,B, p, r, c) be an LPP situation and (N, vopt) the LPP op-
timistic game associated with it. If dN ≤ r, then∑
S∈P
value (S, dS) ≤ value (N, dN ) = v
opt (N) , ∀P ∈ P(N).
Proof. We consider the linear program (1) for the grand coalition N :
max
∑g
j=1 pjxj − cz
s.t: Ax ≤
(
bN
z
)
x ≥ 0g, z ≥ 0.
(5)
Given P ∈ P(N), for every S ∈ P there is an optimal solution
(
xS ; dS
)
for the
linear program (1). Thus,
(( ∑
S∈P
xSj
)g
j=1
;
∑
S∈P
dS
)
is a feasible solution for the
linear program (5), therefore we have
g∑
j=1
pj
(∑
S∈P
xSj
)
− c
( ∑
S∈P
dS
)
≤
g∑
j=1
pjx
N
j − cdN , (6)
where
(
xN ; dN
)
is an optimal solution for (5) such that dN ≤ r. If we rewrite
(6), we obtain
∑
S∈P
g∑
j=1
(
pjx
S
j − cdS
)
≤
g∑
j=1
pjx
N
j − cdN and
∑
S∈P
value (S, dS) ≤
vopt (N) . 
The following lemma, which is given without a proof because it is easy to
derivate, give us two linear programs that, although they have different optimal
solution sets, also have the same optimal values, i.e. they are optimally equiv-
alents. Note that an optimal solution of the second one is the optimal demand
of the common-pool resource for each coalition S, dS . We should highlight that
they only differ in a redundant constrain, z ≤ dS , however, this is the key with
which to prove the next theorem.
Lemma 17 Let (A,B, p, r, c) be an LPP situation. The following linear pro-
grams are optimally equivalents, for all S,
max
∑g
j=1 pjxj − cz
s.t: Ax ≤
(
bS
z
)
z ≤ dS
x ≥ 0g, z ≥ 0.
(7)
max
∑g
j=1 pjxj − cz
s.t: Ax ≤
(
bS
z
)
x ≥ 0g, z ≥ 0.
(8)
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The previous results provide us with two different, but equivalent, ways in
which to tackle the linear programs. In the proof of the following theorem,
we use one or the other depending on which will be more helpful. The next
result tells us that cooperation eliminates the conflict. Because they could all
go together to request the amount of the common-pool resource no matter which
mechanism the manager uses to distribute it, regardless of what happens with
the rest of partitions.
Theorem 18 Let (A,B, p, r, c) be an LPP situation and (N, vopt) the LPP
optimistic game associated with it. If dN ≤ r, then C (vopt) 6= ∅.
Proof. Consider the linear program (7) for the grand coalition,
max
∑g
j=1 pjxj − cz
s.t: Ax ≤
(
bN
z
)
z ≤ dN
x ≥ 0g, z ≥ 0.
(9)
its dual is given by
min
∑q
t=1 b
N
t yt + 0yq+1 + dNyq+2
s.t: Aty ≥ p
yq+1 − yq+2 ≤ c
y ≥ 0q+2.
(10)
Let
(
xN ; dN
)
and
(
yNq , y
N
q+1, 0
)
be the primal and dual optimal solutions for
(9) and (10), respectively with dN ≤ r and yNq+2 = 0
3. It is easy to check that(
yNq , y
N
q+1, 0
)
is a feasible solution for the dual problem of (7) for every coalition
S. If
(
ySq , y
S
q+1, y
S
q+2
)
is an optimal dual solution associated with
(
xS ; dS
)
, it
holds that
∑q
t=1 b
S
t y
N
t + 0y
N
q+1 + dSy
N
q+2 ≥
∑q
t=1 b
S
t y
S
t + 0y
S
q+1 + dSy
S
q+2 =
value(S, dS) = v
opt (S) . Therefore,
∑
i∈S
(∑q
t=1 b
i
ty
N
t
)
≥ vopt (S) , ∀S ⊆ N, and
this implies that
(
biyN
)
i∈N
∈ C (vopt) . 
The following result is given without a proof because it is straightforward,
since vopt ≥ v+ ≥ v−.
Corollary 19 Let (A,B, p, r, c) be an LPP situation,
(
N,P(N), {V (•|P )}P∈P(N)
)
the corresponding partition function form game and (N, v+) , (N, v+) the related
games in characteristic function form. If dN ≤ r, then
1. C (v+) 6= ∅ and C (V ) 6= ∅
2. C (v−) 6= ∅ and C (V ) 6= ∅.
3This is true because the common-pool resource is not scarce in this case.
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Remark 20 Note that this theorem holds for all LPP games
(
N, vR
)
, obtained
from any common-pool resource game (N,R) associated with an LPP situation,
since vopt (S) ≥ vR (S) , for every coalition S.
This result is important for several reasons. Firstly, we have found a case
in which the core of the optimistic game is non empty. Secondly, the Owen set
is very easy to obtain. Thirdly, it shows that cooperation among all agents is
important when it makes the common-pool resource not to be scarce. Finally,
in this case no matter how (N,R) or zS (P ) are.
At a first glance, it seems that an easy condition to assure that the core is
empty, when dN > r, could be ∃P ∈ P(N) such that
∑
S∈P
dS > r, however, is
not true as the next example shows.
Example 21 Let (A,B, r, p, c) be the LPP situation described in Example 14.
In this case, d{1} = d{2} = 7, dN = 5, v
opt (1) = vopt (2) = 10 and vopt (N) = 28.
Thus, there is a partition P = {{1} , {2}} where d{1} + d{2} > 4 and the core
is non empty. Therefore, the aforementioned condition does not guarantee that
the core is empty.
When dN > r and, ∀P ∈ P(N),
∑
S∈P
dS < r the core of the optimistic game
can be empty as Example 10 shows. But it does not hold in general as the
following example illustrates.
Example 22 Let (A,B, r, p, c) be an LPP situation, with three producers, N =
{1, 2, 3} , who produce three products from three resources and a common-pool
resource, where
A =


10 8 7
7 10 5
3 6 7
5 2 4

 , B =

 9 6 85 18 6
17 13 3

 , p =

 89
5

 , c = 1, r = 5.
The corresponding optimistic game is
vopt (1) = 1.5, vopt (2) = 5.25, vopt (3) = 3.5,
vopt (12) = 13.125, vopt (13) = 7.7, vopt (23) = 12.25,
and vopt (N) = 17.5. The demands are
d{1} = 1, d{2} = 1.5, d{3} = 1,
d{12} = 3.75, d{13} = 2.2, d{23} = 3.5,
with dN > 5 and the core is non empty.
Hence, when dN > r we have from Theorem 13 a condition which is sufficient
for the non emptiness of the core. In general, it is not clear whether the core of
the optimistic game is empty or not.
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4.2 The pessimistic approach
From a pessimistic point of view, a coalition of producers S will receive what
agents outside S leave using the partition that minimizes the remainder for S.
This situation can be described as a common-pool resource game (N,Rpes) ,
where Rpes (S) = min
{
min
P :S∈P
{(
r −
∑
T∈P
T 6=S
dT
)
+
}
, dS
}
.
Using this amount Rpes (S) as zS(P ) in (2), for all S ⊆ N, the pessimistic
LPP game (N, vpes) is obtained.
When dN ≤ r the core of this game is non empty since the core of the
optimistic game is non empty and vopt ≥ v+ ≥ v− ≥ vpes. However, when
dN > r it can be empty as Example 10 shows and, therefore, C (v
+) = C (V ) =
C (v−) = C (V ) = ∅. We should point out that in Example 10 the optimistic
and pessimistic games coincide. The following result states a condition for the
non emptiness of the core of the pessimistic game.
Theorem 23 Let (A,B, p, r, c) be an LPP situation and (N, vpes) the pes-
simistic LPP game associated with it. If dN > r and
∑
i∈N
di ≥ r, then C (vpes) 6=
∅.
Proof. Let {di}i∈N be the individual demands of agents in N . Consider
the common-pool resource game (N,w), where w (S) =
(
r −
∑
i/∈S di
)
+
and
w (N) = r.
We will distinguish two cases:
a) If
∑
i∈N
di > r, (N,w) is a standard bankruptcy game and, therefore, it has
a non empty core. Then, an u ∈ RN such that u (N) = r exists and u (S) ≥(
r −
∑
i/∈S di
)
+
≥ min
P :S∈P
{(
r −
∑
T∈P
T 6=S
dT
)
+
}
≥ min
{
min
P :S∈P
{(
r −
∑
T∈P
T 6=S
dT
)
+
}
, dS
}
=
Rpes (S) .
Therefore, C (Rpes) 6= ∅ and using the same arguments as in Theorem 13,
the result holds.
b) If
∑
i∈N
di = r, d (S) =
∑
i∈S
di ≥
(
r −
∑
i/∈S di
)
+
≥ min
P :S∈P
{(
r −
∑
T∈P
T 6=S
dT
)
+
}
≥
min
{
min
P :S∈P
{(
r −
∑
T∈P
T 6=S
dT
)
+
}
, dS
}
= Rpes (S) .
Thus, C (Rpes) 6= ∅ and, then, from Theorem 13 C (vpes) 6= ∅. 
When dN > r and
∑
i∈N
di < r, the core of the pessimistic game can be empty
as in Example 10 or it can be non empty as Example 22 illustrates, since if the
core of the optimistic game is non empty, the core of the pessimistic one is also
non empty. Thus, in this case we have obtained similar results to those applying
the optimistic approach.
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5 Concluding remarks
The model proposed in this paper is novel, arises from many real-life situations
and contains important changes with respect to linear production situations that
affect cooperation. In spite of a small change in the LP model we obtain in a
natural way, different situations where the corresponding games are, in general,
games in partition function form as opposed to games in characteristic function
form. Moreover, contrary to LP games these games can have an empty core.
We should highlight the role that demand of the common-pool resource
for the grand coalition, dN , plays when tackling the problem. We have come
across an interesting case where cooperation makes the common-pool resource
not to be scarce, dN ≤ r, in which the core of the corresponding game is non
empty. When the common-pool resource is not sufficient, dN > r, additional
conditions are needed to assure the non emptiness of the core. The study of
this case when the partition function is known exactly could be addressed using
different approaches: from a non-cooperative point of view, such as that used
in Gutierrez et al (2015), through an auction mechanism or with bankruptcy
techniques which we would like to give our attention to in future research.
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